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Abstract
We study pricing by a two-sided platform when it faces moral hazard on the sellers
side. In doing so, we introduce an equilibrium notion of platform reputation in an innite
horizon model. We nd that with transaction fees only, the platform cannot eliminate the
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can be overcome. The registration fee determines the participation threshold of sellers
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This provides a motivation for platforms to use registration fees in addition to transaction
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1 Introduction
Marketplaces, stock exchanges, and internet-based trading platforms bring together sellers and
buyers of all stripes. Typically it is di¢ cult to control the behavior of these traders as they
transact not with the platform but directly with each other. Hence opportunistic behavior can
reasonably be expected to arise, and evidently does.1 While the trading parties are the ones
directly injured, this is a problem for the platform as it a¤ects the value of the service it o¤ers,
and therefore its ability to extract surplus from traders. That is, platforms face a problem of
reputation, which they can govern only indirectly through the behavior of the parties they host.
For concreteness, consider the example of Apple Inc. It acts as a platform by providing
a marketplace for applications, the App Store, where third-party developers list their wares
for Apple users to purchase. Apple does not carefully audit the quality of these (currently
500,000) products. Apple also cannot directly control the actions of developers, whose lack of
e¤ort may result in applications with security aws, poor performance or that interfere with
other software. Developers may even engage in malicious behavior such as phishing or outright
fraud. Clearly, these problems may a¤ect the credibility of the App Store, and therefore its
ability to sell these applications.
In this paper we analyze how the pricing structure of a platform (like the App Store) a¤ects
the prevalence of opportunistic behavior by traders. We show that the use of registration
fees (in addition to transaction fees) helps mitigate the moral hazard problem to the point of
overcoming it entirely in some instances. Building on the construct of Rochet and Tirole (2003),
we study a model of repeated interactions over an innite horizon. Buyers and sellers need
an intermediary (the platform) to transact, which can charge them fees for its intermediation
services. To capture the problem of opportunistic behavior, we let sellers pick one of a good and
1For example, AlibabaScam.com is an independent site dedicated to outing scammers that operate on the
popular Alibaba.com. In April 2008, a German court ordered eBay to take preventive measures to guard against
the sale of fake Rolex watches.
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a bad action, which a¤ects the buyers payo¤directly. The good action is more costly to sellers,
but more valuable to buyers-for example developers exert e¤ort to ensure their applications do
not compromise computer security. Buyers do not observe the action of their counterparty
before the transaction is completed.
At the heart of the paper is the following. Buyers hold some belief that a seller they are
matched with takes the good action. This belief is the reputation of the platform. A good
reputation is helpful in that the buyersexpected value from a trade increases with reputation,
and so does their willingness to trade. Given the fees charged by the platform and its reputation,
buyers decide whether to trade. If taking the bad action, sellers are detected ex post with
positive probability and may be excluded from the platform.2 Hence a cheating seller runs
the risk of foregoing future trades. The exact cost of exclusion depends on the fees and the
number of participating buyers, as it a¤ects the probability of future transactions. Given fees
and the mass of buyers willing to trade, sellers (i) decide whether to trade, and (ii) which
action to choose if trading. In equilibrium, given the fees charged by the platform, buyers
anticipate sellersbehavior and optimally respond to it and sellers anticipate buyersbehavior
and optimally reply to it.
We show that combined with the threat of exclusion, prices turn out to be simple and
e¤ective tools to mitigate tradersopportunistic behavior.3 Our main result states that with
registration fees and transaction fees (a two-part tari¤), the moral hazard problem can be
2Most trading platforms reserve the right to exclude participants if they are harmful to others, as for example
eBay, MySpace, Yahoo!Stores, Match.com, GumTree.com.au, or even the more laissez-faire craigslist.com. See
their respective Terms and Conditions. This is also the case with the App Store. For example, it is known to
have excluded developers and pulled down applications such as a fake driver-license app and Process Killer,
an app able to stop other apps running in the background.
3Some platforms may use a broader set of instruments, such as vetting their members, or policing them, as do
securities exchanges such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME).
For example, the CME regularly audits its own clearing members for nancial viability. Furthermore, the NYSE
and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) have become a Self-Regulatory Organization (SRO)
through their joint enforcement arm called the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). An SRO is
able to enact and enforce its own rules, as well as the broader rule of law, and engages in dispute resolution
between parties. However no Internet trading site qualies as an SRO.
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entirely overcome in the sense that the platform can implement equilibria where all participating
sellers choose the good action. Moreover, the optimal outcome for the platform (in terms of
reputation and prot) absent moral hazard can be fully replicated, when the buyersvaluation
for the good action is high enough. None of this can be achieved with transaction fees alone,
and the latter requires a proper combination of transaction and registration fees.
In this combination, distinct elements of the two-part tari¤ have di¤erent implications for
traders behavior. The registration fees a¤ect only the agents participation decision (i.e.,
whether to trade on the platform). While sellers trade o¤ the registration fee with the present
value of future trade opportunities when deciding whether to join the platform, that fee is sunk
when they decide between the good and the bad action in a given transaction. In contrast,
transaction fees a¤ect both the participation decision and the incentive constraint (i.e., whether
to behave opportunistically). Increasing transaction fees, for example, decreases the net value
of a transaction for a seller, and thus decreases sellersparticipation. It also erodes the sell-
ers present value of future trades and therefore the salience of exclusion as a punishment.
Consequently, the incentives to behave opportunistically increase.
When a platform charges transaction fees only, it has an incentive to o¤er a discount (com-
pared to the case without moral hazard) in order to induce less opportunistic behavior. Sellers
choosing the bad action are those with a lower valuation of trading on the platform: for them,
exclusion is less costly. By decreasing transaction fees, the platform provides more incentives
for active sellers to choose the good action: it increases the present value of future trade, that
is, the salience of the punishment. But it also invites lower-valuation sellers who will choose
the bad action. So there is always a non-zero measure of sellers who participate and take the
bad action. This problem can be easily overcome if the platform can charge registration fees,
which are used to keep out low-valuation sellers. With the appropriate registration fee, only
high-valuation sellers, who have the incentive to choose the good action, register and trade on
the platform. Opportunistic behavior can be entirely overcome. Registration fees are not only
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useful to restore reputation by keeping out unwanted traders, combined with transaction fees
they also improve the platforms prot.
Our results are important for the following reasons. First, they show that platforms can
address a (potential) moral hazard problem with simple pricing instruments combined with
exclusion. In particular, platforms can use registration fees to keep low-valuation traders who
are more prone to behave opportunistically out of the platform. This seems to be in line with
the Apple example, where small developers pay $100 to access the source codes (and keep
70% of the revenue associated with the sale of their apps). They also suggest that lowering
registration fees to increase market share, for example, may have adverse consequences: it
attracts low-valuation sellers, which increases the prevalence of opportunistic behavior. Second,
our results provide a novel explanation for the diversity of pricing schemes that we observe in
reality. Specically, some platforms (for example, Half.com) charge transaction fees only, while
others use both transaction fees and registration fees (such as App Store, Yahoo!Stores or
MySpaceMyAds.com). We o¤er a rationale for the latter. Finally, our results may have policy
implications. They show that mark-ups may be highly skewed (as in Bolt and Tieman, 2008) as
a response to opportunistic behavior and not just because of demand elasticities. An antitrust
policy based on the analysis of markups must take such an e¤ect into account.
A growing literature has been studying optimal pricing by platforms that connect two sides
of a market (e.g., Caillaud and Jullien, 2003; Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Armstrong, 2006; Rochet
and Tirole, 2006; Hagiu, 2006; Weyl, 2010; Reisinger, 2010). The present paper departs from
all these in that we allow for moral hazard on the sellers side. An important implication
is that transaction and registration fees are not equivalent pricing instruments, even under
monopoly. This di¤ers from Armstrong (2006) and Rochet and Tirole (2006), where they are
interchangeable for a monopoly platform. Equivalence may be void for other reasons, as in
Reisinger (2010). There, traders are heterogenous in their probability of trade, so transaction
fees a¤ect di¤erent types of traders di¤erently, while registration fees have the same impact
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for all traders. Therefore a change in the combination of fees that leaves one type indi¤erent,
may leave another type of seller worse o¤ leading him to abandon the platform. Here agents
decide both whether to participate and to act opportunistically. Registration fees di¤er from
transaction fees primarily because they a¤ect these two decisions di¤erently. The former a¤ect
only the decision to participate, whereas transaction fees a¤ect both. Registration fees may also
di¤er from transaction fees under platform competition. As highlighted by Armstrong (2006),
transaction fees a¤ect the surplus per transaction and therefore the cross-market externality.
This inuences the intensity of competition for traders between platforms, whereas registration
fees remain neutral. In Caillaud and Jullien (2003) and Hagiu (2006), registration fees are
used to break bad expectations of one side of the traders on a platform about the other sides
participation (also in a setting with platform competition). This is because the impact of
registration fees on the agentspayo¤ is independent of the transaction volume, and therefore
of their expectations about participation on the other side. Neither of these two e¤ects are
present in out model, as we focus on the case of a monopoly platform.
In this paper registration fees may be used to sort sellers. Damiano and Li (2007) study
a situation in which a matchmaker also uses registration fees to sort agents. In that paper
matching payo¤s are complementary in the agentstypes, so the e¢ cient pairing is positively
assortative. To maximize revenue, the platform can then create several meeting places, where
similar agents on both sides meet and trade. Because the platform does not observe agents
types, it uses registration fees to sort sellers into each meeting place.4 As in Damiano and
Li (2007), our platform cannot observe traderstypes (valuations) and uses registration fees
to sort sellers. However the motivation to screen sellers is not payo¤ complementarities, but
moral hazard. Registration fees work well because the incentives that drive the action choice
are correlated with the sellers type; the low-valuation sellers are precisely those who have
4Halaburda and Piskorski (2011) study the case of a plaform which adds value to agents with low outside
option by restricting choice. In their case too, the platform screen agents with registration fees.
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incentives to behave opportunistically. So to solve its moral hazard problem, the platform has
to address a problem of adverse selection too.
Finally, our paper relates to a growing literature on platform design where the platform may
be able to use non-price instruments to a¤ect the quality and behavior of its users. Boudreau
and Hagiu (2009) and Hagiu (2009) let the platform directly select the types of traders it
allows in order to control the average quality. In Hagiu and Jullien (2010), it may downgrade
the quality of the service to some users in order to direct their counterparty to their competitors.
As in that literature, we analyze the problem of a platform that attempts to improve the quality
of the service it o¤ers. By combining price instruments with exclusion, a non-price instrument,
the platform can eliminate opportunistic behavior on the part of sellers, increase the value of
its services and improve prots.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we lay out the model.
In Section 3, we analyze the moral hazard problem with transaction fees only. In Section 4, we
allow for registration fees in addition to transaction fees. An example is presented in Section
5. Section 6 discusses some robustness issues related to our key ndings. Section 7 concludes.
All the proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Agents and primitives There is a single platform that o¤ers intermediation services to a
continuum of heterogenous sellers and a continuum of heterogenous buyers every period. Sellers
and buyers need this intermediation: they cannot meet by themselves. Sellers are indexed by
s 2 R and buyers by b 2 R their type. Sellers are long-lived and buyers live one period
only. In each period a new population of buyers with measure one is drawn from a log-concave
distribution G with positive density g.5 The precise characterization of the population of sellers
5Assuming short-lived buyers simplies the analysis and the exposition considerably, but none of our results
depend on it. They all remain valid if, similarly to the case of sellers, we assume that a buyer dies with some
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and its dynamics will be made below. Time is discrete and indexed by  .
Actions and payo¤s Conditional on patronizing the platform, a seller is randomly matched
in each period with a buyer.6 Upon a match a seller chooses (i) whether to trade and (ii) if
trading, an action a 2 fl; hg. We assume that sellersdecisions are made after they are matched
with a buyer for simplicity of exposition. The precise order with which these events occur is
immaterial to the analysis and results. Hence the model captures, for example, both the cases
of an eBay seller who decides whether to trade and to ship a fake product after being matched
with a buyer, and the case of an application developer who rst creates the product and then
lists it on the App Store. We assume that a seller of type s values a transaction according to
v(s; a) =
8><>: s+ d if a = ls if a = h,
where d > 0, so action h is costly to the seller as compared to action l. If matched, a buyer
faces the sole decision of whether to trade. A buyer of type b values a transaction with a seller
taking action a following
u(b; a) =
8><>: b if a = lb+ y if a = h,
where y > 0. So a buyer always prefers that the seller take the high-cost action h over the
alternative l. The parameter y is important in our model. It measures the buyerssensitivity
to the sellersaction and, as we will see, the importance of reputation for the platform. We
probability at the end of each period and a xed measure of new buyers enters the market.
6The fact that every seller is matched with a buyer is compatible, for example, with a situation where
the population of buyers is larger than that of sellers. Indeed, we make the necessary assumptions below to
ensure that this is the case. So, while every seller is matched with a buyer, not every buyer is matched with a
seller. However, the main results in this paper do not depend on these particular assumptions on the matching
technology and the relative size of the buyers and sellerspopulations. They continue to hold if we consider
more generally that the probability that a seller be matched with a buyer is less than one and a function of
the number of buyers and sellers. Finally, the fact that matching is left random is line with the literature, see
Rochet and Tirole (2003) for example.
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assume that y > d, so that implementing action h is socially optimal. Whenever a buyer and a
seller complete a trade, they must pay transaction fees tb and ts, respectively, to the platform.
The net payo¤ to a seller of type s is v(s; a)  ts and to a buyer of type b is u(b; a)  tb. Both
buyers and sellers get zero when they do not trade.
Information Each side of the market is uninformed as to the others type upon transact-
ing. In particular, the buyer does not observe the type of the seller, whose choice of action a
may depend on his type. Moreover, the buyer does not observe the sellers action before the
transaction is completed. Without this information, the buyers valuation of a trade depends
on his expectation (perceived probability) that the seller will choose action h. We call this
expectation the platforms reputation. It plays an important role in the buyers decision to
trade. In equilibrium, it must be identical to the proportion of sellers who choose action h,
among those who trade. The platform remains uninformed as to sellersand buyers types.
However, whenever a seller chooses action l, the platform observes it with probability  < 1
after the transaction is completed. The platform never receives a wrong signal: no signal is
received by the platform if a seller chooses action h. This signal structure attempts to reect
imperfections in buyer feedback to the platform (e.g., disputes may be settled directly), or the
platforms policy of non-systematic arbitration of dispute.7 We assume that sellersactions are
not veriable, or contracting costs are prohibitive compared to the gains from trade. Therefore
contracts that are contingent on the sellersactions are not feasible. When such contracts are
feasible there is no role for reputation.
Prices and incentives The platform charges transaction fees to buyers and sellers whenever
a transaction is completed; it may also use registration fees to regulate access. Absent some
7For example, platforms like MySpace and Match.com explicitly state in their Terms of use Agreement
that they reserve the right, but have no obligation, to become involved in any way with disputes between
members, and in disputes between members and other users.
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incentive device, a buyer has no reason to believe that any seller will take the high action h;
that is, the platforms reputation would always be zero. We call on intertemporal incentives
and assume a natural form of punishment: if detected, sellers who chose action l are excluded
from the platform. That is, they are prevented from trading through the platform forever.
Almost all trading platforms or other platforms that o¤er intermediation services do reserve
the right to exclude members whose behavior they deem inappropriate. Apple Inc reserves the
right to exclude developers from the App Store (and in fact does so routinely).8
Sellers population dynamics With probability m a seller leaves the market (dies) at the
end of each period  . This probability is exogenous, independent of the sellers behavior and
type. Because excluded sellers cannot trade anymore on the platform, we treat them as sellers
who leave the market. Hence, in each period sellers may leave the market either because they
die or because they are excluded from the platform. Every period a xed number (measure)
E of new sellers, drawn from a log-concave distribution F with everywhere positive density
f , enter the market. We assume that E  m. This ensures that in any equilibrium the
measure of sellers is smaller than that of buyers, justifying the simplifying assumption on the
matching technology that all sellers are matched with a buyer. We further assume that the
ratio [1  F (s)]=[1  F (s  k)]; k > 0; is bounded away from zero.9 With these entry and exit
movements of sellers, the distribution and number (measure) of sellers in the population may
vary from one period to the next, although we will focus on stationary distributions.
In this setup we formalize the idea of equilibrium reputation of the platform and transac-
tions, establish existence of an equilibrium, analyze how fees a¤ect that reputation, and address
the question of optimal fees. This analysis is performed in a steady-state, where the measure of
8While exclusion is a natural form of punishment, all the analysis and results in the paper continue to hold
if instead the platform requires a seller caught cheating to re-register with the platform. We discuss this issue
in more detail in Section 6.
9This assumption is used for Lemma 3 only and is satised, for example, for the Logistic and the Extreme
Value distribution.
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sellers and the proportions of sellers who do not trade on the platform, trade and choose action
l, and trade and choose action h are all time invariant. Buyers and sellers seek to maximize
(total discounted) utility, while the platform maximizes total discounted prots. The common
discount factor is  < 1.
3 Transaction Fees and their Shortcomings
We start by analyzing the case where the platform charges transaction fees only. This allows
us to expose the basic mechanics of the model in a simpler setting than with a two-part tari¤.
Also, this demonstrates the limitations of transaction fees under moral hazard.
3.1 Equilibrium Reputation and Transactions
We begin with the characterization of the buyerstrading decisions given the platforms rep-
utation and the transaction fee tb charged to buyers, then turn to the characterization of the
sellersdecisions given the behavior on the buyer side and the transaction fee ts charged to
sellers. Combining these two enables us to derive the equilibrium reputation and transaction
volumes, given the fees charged by the platform.
Buyerstransaction decisions Let r be the reputation of the platform. That is, r is the
probability assigned by a buyer that when trading with a randomly drawn seller, the latter
chooses action h. If matched, a buyer faces the choice of whether to trade. Conditional on
being of type b, her expected value from the transaction is ru(b; h)+(1 r)u(b; l) tb = b+ry tb.
Hence the buyer trades if and only if b+ ry   tb  0. Given this, we can dene
Db(tb; r)  1 G(tb   ry) (1)
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as the proportion of buyers who accept to trade on the platform given the transaction fee tb and
r (reputation). We refer to Db(tb; r) as buyer participation. It can be interpreted as the buyers
demand for transactions on the platform. Following the assumptions on G(b); Db(tb; r) is
continuous, decreasing in tb, and increasing in r. An immediate consequence of this observation
is that reputation is valuable to the platform. All things otherwise equal, the higher the
platforms reputation, the higher the measure of buyers willing to trade on it.
Sellerstransaction decisions given buyer participation Fix buyer participation. Let
it be Xb in any given period.10 Upon being matched with a buyer, a seller has two decisions
to make: whether to trade and which action a 2 fl; hg to take. These decisions depend on
the sellers payo¤ from the current transaction, and on the sellers continuation value of trade.
When buyer participation is the same in every period, the sellers problem is stationary and
the sellers continuation value of trade is also the same in every period. For a seller of type s,
let V (s) denote the present value of the expected future payo¤s at the beginning of a period.
V (s) corresponds to the value of the platform to a seller of type s and satises the (Bellman)
equation
V (s) = Xbmaxf0 + (1 m)V (s); s+ d  ts + (1  )(1 m)V (s); s  ts + (1 m)V (s)g
+(1 Xb)(1 m)V (s). (2)
With probability Xb the seller is matched with a buyer who wishes to trade and faces three
options: (i) he does not trade but receives V (s) next period, (ii) he trades and chooses l, collects
s+d  ts now and receives V (s) with probability 1  next period, (iii) he trades and selects h,
collects s  ts and receives V (s) next period for sure. With probability 1 Xb the seller is not
matched with a buyer willing to trade. Throughout, a seller dies with probability m. Hence
10Because we are interested in steady-state equilibria where all variables are stationary, it is su¢ cient to study
sellersoptimal behavior when buyer participation is the same in every period.
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Lemma 1 A seller of type s accepts to trade if and only if s+ d  ts.
Only sellers with a high-enough valuation trade, whereas the others do not. The traders
consist of the sellers to whom the net value of a transaction is positive when they choose action
l. Given transaction fee ts, the exact proportion of sellers accepting to trade in period  depends
on the distribution of sellers in that period F . Let
Ds (t
s)  1  F (ts   d) (3)
denote that proportion. Ds (t
s) is referred to as seller participation. It is decreasing in ts. For
expositional convenience, let sl(ts)  ts d represent the threshold level of s above which sellers
accept to trade given transaction fee ts. Then Ds (t
s) = 1  F (sl(ts)).
The sellers incentive problem is to choose between actions l and h. A seller takes the
high-cost action h if and only if the immediate gain from cheating on the current transaction,
d, does not exceed the reduction of his expected continuation value of trade if being excluded
from the platform. That is, a seller of type s who trades chooses action h if and only if
d  (1 m)V (s). The optimal action is characterized as follows.
Lemma 2 A seller of type s who accepts to trade (and expects buyersparticipation to be Xb
in the subsequent periods) chooses action h if and only if
d   (1 m)
1  (1 m)X
b(s  ts). (4)
When condition (4) holds, s and V (s) are su¢ ciently high so that choosing action h is
optimal, and conversely if it fails. We see that sellersincentives to choose action h depend not
only on ts but also on the buyersparticipation Xb. These cross-market e¤ects are a central
feature of two-sided markets.11 For expositional convenience, let sh(ts; Xb) denote the threshold
11For example, in Caillaud and Jullien (2003), the sellersdecision to register on the platform depends on the
buyersparticipation on the platform and vice-versa. Here it is the sellers incentive to choose the high action
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value of s above which sellers choose action h; it must satisfy sh(ts; Xb) > sl(ts) for all ts and
Xb > 0. Then given ts and Xb > 0, we have three cases:
 s < sl(ts) sellers do not trade;
 s 2 sl(ts); sh(ts; Xb) sellers trade and choose action l; and
 s  sh(ts; Xb) sellers trade and choose action h.
Equilibrium In equilibrium, buyersbehavior has to be optimal given fees and reputation,
sellersbehavior has to be optimal given fees and buyersparticipation, and platform reputation
has to be consistent with sellersbehavior. The proportion of sellers who trade on the platform
and the proportion of sellers who trade and choose action h depends on the distribution of
sellers and may evolve over time. This is because some sellers leave the market and others, not
necessarily identical to them, enter it. In particular, excluding sellers in a given period whose
types are in the interval

sl(t
s); sh(t
s; Xb)

may imply a reduction in the proportion of those
types of sellers. Throughout, we focus on steady-state equilibria: the proportions of sellers who
do not trade on the platform, trade and choose action l, and trade and choose action h, are
time invariant. Let N; L, and H denote, respectively, these proportions.12
Denition 1 (Equilibrium transactions and reputation) Given transactions fees tb and
ts, a steady-state equilibrium is a tuple hXb; N; L; H; S; ri such that:
1. (steady-state conditions) the number of total sellers and the proportions of those sellers
who do not trade, trade and choose action l, and trade and choose action h remain
constant,i.e.,
in a transaction that depends on the buyers participation on the platform.
12Alternatively, we could have focused on situations where the entire distribution of sellers is time invariant.
Note, however, that our equilibrium concept encompasses such cases as special. A time invariant distribution of
sellers implies time invariant proportions of sellers who do not trade on the platform, trade and choose action
l, and trade and choose action h.
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(a) EF (sl(ts)) = mNS
(b) E[F (sh(ts; Xb))  F (sl(ts))] = [m+ (1 m)Xb]LS
(c) E[1  F (sh(ts; Xb))] = mHS
(d) N + L +H = 1;
2. (buyer participation is consistent with r and tb) Xb = Db(tb; r) and
3. (reputation is consistent with seller behavior) r = H

L+H .
Equilibrium transaction volumes and reputation are then characterized by these six con-
ditions. The rst four are necessary for the proportions N;L, and H to be stationary, well
dened, and consistent with seller optimal behavior given ts and buyer participation Xb; they
also determine the (endogenous) measure of active sellers (S). Stationarity follows from con-
ditions 1.(a)-1.(c), which require the number of new sellers entering the market to be identical
to the number of sellers exiting, (a) among those sellers who do not trade on the platform,
(b) those who trade and cheat, and (c) those who trade and do not cheat. The fth condition
dictates that buyers transaction decisions be optimal given transaction fee tb and platform
reputation. The last condition states that platform reputation be consistent with the sellers
optimal behavior regarding action a. The rst result establishes the existence of an equilibrium
and qualies equilibrium reputation under transaction fees.
Proposition 1 For each (ts; tb) an equilibrium exists. In any equilibrium r 2 (0; 1).
Irrespective of the transaction fees charged by the platform to sellers and buyers, the equi-
librium reputation of the platform is always strictly smaller than one. There is always a positive
measure of sellers who trade on the platform and choose action l. These are the sellers in the
interval [sl(ts); sh(ts; Xb)).
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Although no equilibrium in which reputation is equal to one exists, the level of transaction
fees does a¤ect the equilibrium reputation.13 A higher fee tb for buyers implies that fewer of
them trade when matched with a seller. This decreases the continuation value V (s), which
withers the punishment. The incentive to choose the more costly action h is therefore less
powerful and in equilibrium, the reputation of the platform drops. Altering the sellers fee ts
has a slightly more intricate impact. A higher fee a¤ects the sellersparticipation this is the
participation e¤ect. But a higher transaction fee also depresses the continuation value V (s), so
fewer sellers choose action h this is the incentive e¤ect. Thus a higher ts implies fewer sellers
with low valuation s (who would choose action l), but more cheating among higher valuation
sellers. Whether increasing ts has a positive or negative e¤ect on reputation depends on the
magnitude of each of these two e¤ects. In our model, the second e¤ect is dominant, implying
that equilibrium reputation decreases with ts.14
Reputational concerns inuence the platforms choice of ts and tb in the following sense. In
a standard model, transaction fees a¤ect the prot per transaction (ts + tb) and the number
of transactions DbDsS. Without moral hazard, volumes respond directly to prices tb and ts
(participation decision). In our model, there is an additional channel: both ts and tb also a¤ect
the equilibrium reputation, which in turn modies buyer participation and the number of total
sellers in the population. Optimal transaction fees, which maximize the platforms prot
 =

1  D
bDsS(ts + tb);
where Db and Ds are consistent with the equilibrium, balance all these e¤ects. When the
parameter y is high (i.e. buyers are sensitive to reputation), the platform has the incentive
to ensure a high reputation. Using transaction fees only, it faces two limitations. First, as
13In general, one cannot rule out the possibility of multiple equilibria. In what follows, we focus on stable
equilibria. We dene stable equilibrium as an equilibrium in which, following a small perturbation in the level
of reputation, a convergence back to the equilibrium occurs.
14For a formal statement and a proof of this result see Roger and Vasconcelos (2011).
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stated in Proposition 1, the platform is not able to achieve a reputation of one, although
it may be optimal (see benchmark case below). Second, to achieve a high reputation, the
platform has to charge sellers low transaction fees, which erodes prots. Before continuing to
the analysis of the e¤ect of registration fees on equilibrium outcomes and platforms prots,
we analyze a benchmark where the platform can directly control sellersactions and, therefore,
its reputation. This benchmark further illustrates the limitations of transaction fees, as it
shows that a reputation of one may be optimal when the platform can directly control sellers
behavior. Also, it helps highlight the role of registration fees. It will serve a reference against
which to compare equilibrium outcomes when the platform charges such fees.
3.2 A Benchmark Case With no Moral Hazard
Suppose that the platform can select directly the reputation r it wants, in addition to the
transaction fees (ts; tb) it charges. That is, suppose that the platform observes sellerstypes
and for each seller is able to (i) impose the sellers action a if trading and (ii) prevent a seller
from trading. The only thing the platform cannot do is force a seller to trade.15 In this setting
there is no moral hazard in the sense that the platform can dictate the action of each seller
who trades.
Since the sellers who eventually choose action l have the consent of the platform, no exclusion
occurs. Thus, the relevant steady-state distribution of sellers is F and their number S = E=m:
Moreover, since the platforms prot is increasing in the number of transactions (of course,
provided ts + tb > 0), given a transaction fee ts it is optimal for the platform to allow all
sellers with a valuation s > ts to trade and impose that they choose action h. The platforms
problem is then to choose the number of low action sellers that it will permit to trade. Let
Xs denote the proportion of sellers who trade and r the reputation. Reputation must satisfy
15This is reminiscent of Hagiu (2009), where low-value traders may be excluded.
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r = (1   F (ts))=Xs, which necessarily implies that Xs = (1   F (ts))=r. We can write the
platforms problem as
max
ts;tb;r
(ts; tb; r) = (E=m)

1 G(tb   ry) 1  F (ts)
r

(ts + tb)
subject to
1  F (ts)
1  F (ts   d)  r  1.
and claim the following.
Lemma 3 For y su¢ ciently large, the solution of the above problem involves r = 1 and trans-
action fees such that ts + tb = [1  F (ts)]=f(ts) = [1 G(tb   y)]=g(tb   y).
The trade-o¤ involves increasing reputation, which buyers value because y is high, at the
expense of the number of sellers, who pay ts even if they choose action l. But when y is large
enough, the former e¤ect dominates and leads to a corner solution: it is worthwhile dropping
all the sellers that choose action l. Importantly, when y is large the platform can achieve
strictly higher prots when it is able to choose reputation directly than when it is not the
case studied above. As a preview of forthcoming results, if the platform can replicate this
allocation by charging a registration fee to sellers, it will necessarily increase its prots relative
to the case where it uses only transaction fees.
4 Registration Fees and Moral Hazard
As evidenced in the preceding analysis, transaction fees alone are not su¢ cient to overcome
moral hazard. Yet we are about to show that only one additional instrument can be su¢ cient to
do so. Throughout this section we consider the case where the platform may charge registration
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fees to sellers in addition to transaction fees.16 Let T s denote the registration fee for sellers.
These are paid only once in order to access the platform (like a lifetime membership). Only
registered sellers may use the platform.
4.1 AgentsDecisions and Equilibrium with Registration
Since buyers do not have to register to trade, the buyersproblem depends only on transaction
fee tb and reputation r. So the decision rules are identical to those presented in Section 3.
Buyer participation is then given by Db as dened by (1).
For registered sellers, the registration fee has no direct bearing on their decisions whether
to accept a trade and which action to select. Therefore V (s) is also not a¤ected directly by
the registration fee T s.17 As before, given transaction fee ts and buyer participation Xb > 0, if
registered, sellers of type (i) s < sl(ts) never trade, (ii) s 2

sl(t
s); sh(t
s; Xb)

trade and choose
action l, and (iii) s  sh(ts; Xb) trade and choose action h. Using this, the solution to the
Bellman equation (2) reads
V (s) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if s < sl(ts)
Xb
1 (1 m)[1 Xb] [s+ d  ts] if sl(ts)  s < sh(ts; Xb)
Xb
1 (1 m) [s  ts] if sh(ts; Xb)  s.
V (s) is continuous and increasing in s. Naturally a seller of type s registers if and only if
V (s)   T s  0. Let sR(ts; T s; Xb) denote the value of s such that this latter condition just
binds, when sellersfees are ts; T s > 0 and buyers participation is Xb > 0. For expositional
16Using registration fees on the buyer side plays no role on the set of equilibrium outcomes. This is because
there is no moral hazard on the buyersside. A proof of this result can be found in Roger and Vasconcelos
(2011). Thus, the platform cannot do any better by charging a registration fee to buyers. This is in line with
Rochet and Tirole (2006) and Armstrong (2006), who abstract from the issue of moral hazard. In both cases,
transaction fees and registration fees are equivalent pricing instruments for a monopoly platform.
17It may have an inuence through the equilibrium reputation of the platform, which at this point we take
as given.
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convenience, let sR(ts; 0; Xb) = sl(ts). Clearly, sR(ts; T s; Xb)  sl(ts) when T s  0. Without
loss of generality, hereinafter we focus on instances where T s is non-negative, thus sellers of
type s  sR(ts; T s; Xb) register with the platform and trade, whereas the others do not.18 For
buyers, the relevant sellers are those who are registered and trade. Hence, redening seller
participation in period  as the proportion of sellers who register and trade, it is now given by
Ds (t
s; T s; Xb)  1  F (sR(ts; T s; Xb)).
Equilibrium With these registration fees, the sellersparticipation decision depends not only
on transaction fees ts, but also on the registration fee T s and on buyersparticipation. This
is because participation requires registration, and the value of being registered depends on
the measure of agents on the other side of the market.19 Accordingly, the denition of an
equilibrium needs to be adjusted.
Denition 2 (Equilibrium with registration) Given transaction fees tb and ts and regis-
tration fees T s, an equilibrium is a tuple hXb; N; L; H; S; ri such that:
1. (steady-state conditions) the number of total sellers and the proportions of those sellers
who do not trade, trade and choose action l, and trade and choose action h remain
constant,i.e.,
(a) EF (sR(ts; T s; Xb)) = mNS
(b) E[F (maxfsR(ts; T s; Xb); sh(ts; Xb)g) F (sR(ts; T s; Xb))] = (m+(1 m)Xb)LS
(c) E[1  F (maxfsR(ts; T s; Xb); sh(ts; Xb)g))] = mHS
18It is never optimal for the platform to set a negative registration fee T s. That would mean to subsidize
registration of sellers who do not trade, which would not increase seller participation and consequently would
not increase the platforms prot.
19In contrast to transaction fees, where only the sellers incentive problem is directly dependent on the buyers
participation.
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(d) N + L +H = 1;
2. (buyer participation and registration is consistent with r and tb) Xb = Db(tb; r)
3. (reputation is consistent with seller behavior) r = H

L+H .
The denition remains conceptually the same as before. The main di¤erence is that with
registration fees, the denition of equilibrium must reect the fact that only those sellers who
register may trade on the platform. Proposition 2 is the counterpart of Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 For each (tb; ts; T s) there exists an equilibrium.
This result di¤ers from Proposition 1 because when agents have to register to trade on the
platform, the equilibrium reputation is not necessarily strictly lower than one. Now we are
ready to turn to the main result of the paper.
4.2 The Role of Registration Fees
We rst note that the equilibrium reputation is increasing in T s; registration fees always assist
in improving the platforms reputation. The registration fee reduces seller participation (those
with a lower type opt out), while not a¤ecting their incentives with respect to the action a.20
Since the low-type sellers are precisely those with the incentive to choose action l, an increase
in registration fees reduces the proportion of cheaters among sellers who trade, thus increasing
reputation. That is, the registration fee works as a way of selecting the sellers that trade on
the platform. This selection of sellers can be taken to the extreme, so that only those sellers
who choose action h if trading, end up registering and trading on the platform. Then
Proposition 3 Given transaction fees ts and tb, there exists a registration fee T s such that in
equilibrium the platforms reputation is one.
20For a proof of this result see Roger and Vasconcelos (2011).
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By choosing su¢ ciently high registration fees for sellers, the platform can achieve a repu-
tation of one: no seller chooses action l. That is, moral hazard can be entirely overcome. This
is never feasible with transaction fees only; in that case the equilibrium reputation is always
strictly lower than one. A high reputation is especially valuable when y is large (as shown in
the benchmark (Lemma 3)) because then inducing the high action h generates a higher social
surplus, some of which accrues to the platform. So it is the standard prot motive that leads
the intermediary to seek a high reputation. It is then a matter of nding appropriate transfers
to implement this action h. This is the object of the next proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose that it is optimal for the platform to implement a reputation of one
in the benchmark case (e.g., y is large enough). Then, there exist fees (ts; tb; T s) that generate
the same allocation as the optimal allocation.
Registration fees can be so helpful as to implement the optimal allocation dened in the
benchmark case. In other words, there exist fees that generate the same buyer participation,
the same seller participation, and the same prots as those achieved in the benchmark case
when buyers value action h su¢ ciently highly. The reason turns out to be remarkably simple
and widely applicable. Transaction fees a¤ect both the sellersparticipation and their incentives
(the choice of action a), while registration fees inuence the participation decision only. This
allows the platform to appropriately combine transaction and registration fees to provide high
incentives for sellers to choose action h conditional on participation, and simultaneously to
keep low-type sellers out of the platform. With the appropriate mix of fees, the marginal
participating seller never takes action l, and is made to correspond to the marginal seller
absent moral hazard.
We conclude this section with two observations. First, registration fees in this paper are
di¤erent to posting a bond. This is because registration fees do not directly inuence the sellers
behavior. Once paid, they are sunk and a sellers decision to take the low action l is independent
22
of T s.21 Second, from the formulation of the reputation one can see that it depends positively
on . With better monitoring technology, the cost of the low action increases. However, the
results that with registration fees the platform can fully eliminate opportunistic behavior and
replicate the benchmark allocation without moral hazard do not depend on the precise value
of . They only requires that  > 0. The reason is that even if  is very low, there always
exists a combination of registration and transaction fees that implements reputation one and,
in particular, the allocation in the benchmark. Of course if  = 0 reputation is always zero.
5 An Example
To further illustrate our results we present a numerical example where we compute optimal fees,
platform prots, and platform reputation under transaction fees only and when the platform
can charge both types of fees. We also compute social welfare under both pricing regimes.
Here total welfare is the sum of the value generated by the transactions that are completed.22
Buyers and sellers are drawn from logistic distributions. We x the parameters ; ;m, and d
and let y vary. Recall that y parameterizes buyerssensitivity to sellersaction, and therefore
21This di¤ers from Shapiro (1983), for example, who also studies an intertemporal setting where buyers cannot
observe quality prior to purchase. In Shapiro (1983) rm reputation is acquired via the production of quality
goods, which are sold below cost in the initial period. This initial investment is recovered over time through a
price premium, which provides incentive to continue producing high quality. The free-entry condition implies
that future prot ows equal the initial investment in reputation. This initial investment thus works like posting
a bond. Here the zero prot condition holds only for the marginal seller; for all the other sellers, expected prot
exceeds the initial investment (the registration fee). That is, registration fees a¤ect the platforms reputation
not because they work like posting a bond, but through sellersselection.
22Computing welfare is more involved than at rst glance: it depends on the number of transactions, the types
of sellers and buyers who trade, and the actions chosen by sellers in each transaction. A transaction generates
u(b; l)+v(s; l) = s+d+ b if the seller chooses action l and u(b; h)+v(s; h) = s+ b+y if the seller chooses action
h. Therefore, total welfare depends on the precise distribution of sellers. Our notion of equilibrium requires only
that the proportion of sellers who do not trade on the platform, trade and choose action l, and trade and choose
action h be time invariant. We focus on equilibria where the distribution of sellers is time invariant. In such
equilibria this distribution is uniquely identied. Note also that any equilibrium in this paper can be obtained
with a time invariant distribution of sellers. Moreover, for each equilibrium, such a distribution is unique. If bf
denotes the equilibrium distribution of sellers, total welfare when the platform charges only transaction fees isZ sh
sl
Z 1
tb ry
S(s+ d+ b)g(b) bf(s)dgds+ Z 1
sh
Z 1
tb ry
S(s+ b+ y)g(b) bf(s)dgds:
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to reputation. By varying y, we can capture the importance of registration fees as buyers
become more sensitive to reputation, and consequently reputation becomes more important to
the platform. Table 1 shows the results for several selected values of y.
Transaction Fees Only Transaction and Registration Fees
Optimal Fees Optimal Fees
y tb ts r Prot Welfare tb ts T s r Prot Welfare
0.50 0.89 0.63 0.82 19.80 53.01 1.04 0.12 1.21 1 21.42 55.18
1 1.14 0.42 0.85 25.97 69.60 1.35 0.06 0.96 1 29.05 73.04
1.5 1.44 0.21 0.88 33.95 90.02 1.67 -0.28 1.61 1 38.53 94.42
2 1.79 0.001 0.9 43.97 113.49 2 -0.37 1.46 1 50 119.31
2.5 2.02 0.001 0.91 55.83 135.94 2.34 -0.42 1.09 1 63.55 147.58
3 2.32 0.001 0.92 69.04 157.60 2.68 -0.54 1.01 1 79.21 178.98
Table 1: Optimal fees, equilibrium reputation, prots and welfare when  = 0:97,  = 0:6,
m = 0:1, E = 10 and d = 0:5. Values rounded to the second decimal place.
The example conrms that platforms may nd it optimal to choose a price structure that
completely discourages sellers to cheat. It also illustrates that seeking a reputation of one may
be optimal even when y is very close to d. The more sensitive buyers are to reputation (i.e. the
higher y), the more essential are the registration fees. The di¤erence between the transaction
fees charged to buyers and the transaction fees charged to sellers increases with y. This suggests
that in the presence of moral hazard on the sellers side, one should expect prices to be (more)
skewed toward the buyer side (see Bolt and Tieman, 2008). Note that reputation increases
If the platform also charges registration fees, total welfare is similar if sR < sh. Simply replace sl in the above
expression with sR. If sR  sh, then the expression for the total welfare collapses toZ 1
sR
Z 1
tb y
S(s+ b+ y)g(b) bf(s)dgds:
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with y even when the platform charges only transaction fees.23
The transaction fees charged to sellers when the platform uses registration fees are lower
than those when it does not, and conversely for the buyers. When the platform charges
registration fees to sellers, it needs not use transaction fees to extract surplus, and reducing
transaction fees improves incentives (increases reputation). On the buyersside, fees must be
kept low in the absence of registration fees to encourage participation and preserve reputation.
When buyers pay a low transaction fee, more buyers trade on the platform, decreasing the
sellersincentive to cheat. But when the platform can use registration fees, it has a substitute
tool to keep reputation high. As a consequence, the platform can increase the transaction fee
charged to buyers in order to extract more surplus from them.
Not only are both platform prot and social welfare higher under the two-part tari¤, the
di¤erence in prot and welfare under the two regimes increases with y. That is, introducing
registration fees is not only privately optimal for the platform, it is also socially e¢ cient. The
argument for this is subtle. Total welfare depends on (i) the surplus generated per transaction
(quality of transaction) and (ii) the total number of transactions. With registration fees rep-
utation increases, which implies that the average surplus per transaction (quality) increases.
The total number of transactions depends on the number of active buyers and sellers. With
registration fees reputation is higher, which encourages buyers to participate, but the platforms
response is to increase the buyerstransaction fee. This second e¤ect curtails buyersparticipa-
tion and is the dominant e¤ect. Introducing registration fees decreases the sellersparticipation
rate. But it enlarges the pool of active sellers because fewer (or even no) sellers are excluded.
Overall, more sellers are active and this more than compensates the loss of buyers. So in this
example, more transactions are entered into and each generates a larger surplus.
23Observe that the optimal price structure depends on the specic distributions of buyers and sellers. In
particular, if those distributions are such that the price elasticity of the demand on the buyer side is su¢ ciently
higher than that on the seller side, the platform will optimally charge lower fees to buyers than to sellers. This
may explain why some platforms charge lower (or no) fees to buyers even in the presence of moral hazard on
the sellersside.
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These mechanics generate negative transaction fees for the sellers an extreme skewness.
Negative transaction fees are not uncommon in two-sided markets, as, for example, credit cards
featuring loyalty programs, or free parking at shopping malls. Nonetheless, one may object to
negative fees in that they potentially provide a seller and a buyer incentives to collude to collect
the payment. Notice rst that this could never be the case in the example because the sum
ts + tb is always positive (a net payment to the platform). Second, buyers and sellers meet
only once per period in this model; that is, it is enough to control the matching technology
to preempt this form of collusion. Furthermore, in our model, transaction fees need not be
negative for reputation to be one (see Proposition 3).
6 Discussion
Our model follows that of Rochet and Tirole (2003), where agents derive usage benets only. In
contrast Armstrong (2006) focuses on heterogenous participation benets. Even if we let agents
be heterogenous in both usage and participation benets, the role of registration fees that we
highlight in this paper remains. With usage and participation benets, sellers are characterized
by valuations along these two dimensions. As before, high-valuation sellers do not take the low
action. These now include sellers with low transaction benets but high-enough participation
benets (which are substitutable). As in our model, registration fees select the high-valuation
sellers only.
Throughout the paper we assume that a consumers benet of a good action (y) is inde-
pendent of the buyers type (b). More generally, they may be linked, i.e., y  y(b). One
appealing possibility is that y increases with b: high-valuation buyers also care more about not
being cheated. All the results in the paper continue to hold in this case.24 The exception is
Lemma 3, that states conditions under which a reputation of one is optimal in the benchmark
24To be rigorous, it is required that y be continuous in b.
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case without moral hazard. If y increases with b, the su¢ cient condition is no longer that y
be su¢ ciently large, but that y be su¢ ciently large relative to y0(b). This ensures that buyer
participation is su¢ ciently sensitive to the reputation of the platform, leading the platform to
choose a high reputation even if that implies a lower volume of transactions.
Similarly we assume that a sellers cost d of taking the good action is independent of the
sellers type s. It is easy to see that if d decreases with s all our results hold. However, if d
increases with s (the cost of the good action is higher for higher-valuation sellers), there may
exist equilibria with zero reputation. In some cases only these equilibria may exist. The threat
of exclusion is insu¢ cient to induce even the high-valuation sellers to choose the good action:
they gain more from trading on the platform, but even more from cheating. Of course, the use
of registration fees when there are only equilibria with zero reputation is ine¤ective. All sellers
choose the low action, so there is not point in using registration fees to keep low-valuation
sellers out. However, if equilibria with positive reputation exist, registration fees are useful, as
in this paper.
We let registration fees be paid once only. In many practical instances registration may
have to be renewed, i.e. paid at regular intervals. In that case, registration fees do a¤ect the
sellerscontinuation value and therefore do change their incentive with respect to the action
choice. In other words, registration fees have both a selection e¤ect and an incentive e¤ect. In
the extreme, if they are paid every period they act exactly like transaction fees and the benet
of registration disappears. As the interval increases, the incentive e¤ect decreases relative to
the selection e¤ect. In these intermediate cases, registration fees do help in sorting sellers. In
the limit, which is our case, the incentive e¤ect vanishes.25
There may exist other means to deal with moral hazard, such as ex post nes, screening
of members, legal remedies, and so forth. The mechanism highlighted in this paper has the
25Registration fees act like transaction fees when registration has to be renewed every period because of the
simplifying assumption that a seller can trade at most once per period. If multiple transactions are possible in
the same period, registration fees di¤er again from transaction fees even if they have to be paid every period.
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advantage of being simple, both conceptually and in terms of implementation. It may also
be conceivable to let transaction fees vary with a players history. Without registration fees
this can never yield a reputation of one. One could also conceive of asking a seller caught
deviating to re-register (pay another fee, which may be di¤erent from the initial registration
fee) to be allowed back on the platform in lieu of exclusion. At a minimum this requires some
information about sellersbehavior; that is, it requires that the platform be able to keep track
of the sellers otherwise fees cannot be made contingent on behavior. The sellersresponse to
such a fee depends on its value. If the fee is lower than d=((1  m)) it fails to provide any
incentive. Even the high-valuation sellers prefer taking the low action, be caught and re-register
than choosing the high action. When the fee is larger than d=((1 m)), all the analysis and
results in the paper hold. Low-valuation sellers do not trade on the platform. Intermediate-
valuation sellers trade, choose the low action and never register again if caught; it is not worth
the cost. High-valuation sellers prefer to choose the high action instead of facing the risk of
having to re-register to trade again. Thus, such a fee has the exact same e¤ect as excluding
sellers who cheat. Seller exclusion and re-registration fees are perfectly substitute mechanisms
for the platform.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we study pricing strategies available to a monopoly platform in the face of moral
hazard on one side of the (two-sided) market. If the platform can use transaction fees only,
it can alleviate, but not overcome, the moral hazard problem. This requires some distortion
of its fees relative to the moral hazard-free environment. If registration fees are possible, the
platform is able to overcome the moral hazard problem and increase prots. Registration fees
allow the platform to select higher valuation sellers with lower incentives to cheat. Improving
on the moral hazard problem is important as it increases surplus extraction from both sides.
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The mechanism we suggest is simple and easily implementable. It is also quite robust to
perturbations of the assumptions, and importantly, not reliant on the precision of the infor-
mation (). Hence we are comfortable drawing some implications for business strategies and
antitrust policy. The question of platform competition under moral hazard is left open for
future research.
8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. First the only if part. Suppose that s + d < ts. This implies that
also s < ts. Since V (s) is non-negative because the seller can always choose not to trade at
any given match, it is clear from direct inspection of each of the sellers payo¤s inside the curly
brackets on the right-hand side of (2) that not trading dominates both trading and choosing
action l and trading and choosing action h.
Now the if part. Suppose that s+d  ts. If it is also the case that s  ts, then regardless of
V (s) a matched seller of type s is better o¤ trading and choosing action h than not trading at
allthe third term inside the curly brackets in (2) is greater than the rst. So in this case trading
and choosing action h clearly dominates not trading. If instead s < ts, the opposite occurs, i.e.,
to trade and choose action h is dominated by not to trade at all. As a consequence, (2) collapses
into V (s) = Xbmaxf0+(1 m)V (s); s+d ts+(1 )(1 m)V (s)g+(1 Xb)(1 m)V (s).
Because s+d ts  0, the solution to this equation is V (s) = Xb[s+d ts]=[1 (1 m)(1 Xb)].
Note that this solution satises V (s)  s+ d  ts + (1  )V (s), which means precisely that
for a matched seller not trading is worse than trading and choosing action l.
Proof of Lemma 2. As a preliminary fact note that the right-hand side of (4) can be written
as (1 m)V ND(s), where V ND(s) = [1=(1  (1 m))]Xb[s  ts] corresponds to the present
value of the expected payo¤s to a seller of type s who trades on the platform and never cheats.
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We now prove the result in the lemma.
First the only if part. We prove the equivalent statement that if condition (4) is not
satised, then the sellers optimal decision when matched is not to choose action h. Suppose
that condition (4) is not satised. This means that the seller is better o¤ deviating once and
then, if not excluded from the platform, choosing the high action forever. Since the problem is
stationary, the sellers optimal decision given a match must always be the same. Thus (always)
choosing action h given a match is not optimal.
Now the if part. Suppose that (4) holds. Since the right-hand side of (4) is given by
(1 m)V ND(s) and by denition V ND(s)  V (s), this implies that d  (1 m)V ND(s) 
(1 m)V (s) and therefore taking the low action cannot be optimal to the seller.
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider an arbitrary pair of fees (tb; ts). Fix r 2 [0; 1]. Let
Xb = Db(tb; r) so that point 2 of Denition 1 is satised. Let xl = sl(ts) and xh = sh(ts; Xb).
Finally, let
N =
[m+ (1 m)Xb]F (xl)
m+ (1 m)Xb[1  F (xh) + F (xl)] (5)
L =
m[F (xh)  F (xl)]
m+ (1 m)Xb[1  F (xh) + F (xl)] (6)
H =
[m+ (1 m)Xb][1  F (xh)]
m+ (1 m)Xb[1  F (xh) + F (xl)] (7)
S = E

1
m
  (1 m)X
b[F (xh)  F (xl)]
m(m+ (1 m)Xb)

(8)
Given Xb; xl; and xh, these values of N; L; H, and S constitute the unique solution to
the system of equations dened by the set of conditions in point 1 of Denition 1. Clearly,

Xb; N; L;H; S; r

satises all the conditions in Denition 1 if in addition r = H=(L+H).
Now, for any r 2 [0; 1], let Xb = Db(tb; r), xl = sl(ts), xh = sh(ts; Xb) and N , L, H, and
S be as in (5)-(8). Continuity of: (i) Db(tb; r) in r, (ii) sh(ts; Xb) in Xb and (iii) F , implies
30
that H=(L + H) is continuous in r. Moreover, since xh > xl, then L > 0, which implies that
0 < H=(L +H) < 1. Since H=(L +H) is continuous in r and 0 < H=(L +H) < 1, it follows
by Browers Fixed Point Theorem that for some r 2 [0; 1], r = H=(L+H). Furthermore, since
0 < H=(L+H) < 1, that value of r 2 (0; 1).
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose that ts; t
b
, and r < 1 is a solution to the above problem. We
use three necessary conditions for ts; t
b
, and r < 1 to be an optimum and show that when y
is su¢ ciently large they cannot hold simultaneously.
1. @(ts; t
b
; r)=@r  0. This is equivalent to (E=m)(ts+tb)1 F (t
s)
r [g(t
b
 yr)y 1 G(t
b yr)
r ] 
0. Since (ts + t
b
)
1 F (ts)
r > 0 (otherwise prot would be zero), this implies that
yr  1 G(t
b
   yr)
g(tb   yr)
. (9)
2. @(ts; t
b
; r)=@t
b = 0. Following the same steps as in 1, we obtain that this condition
implies that
ts + t
b
 =
1 G(tb   yr)
g(tb   yr)
. (10)
3. An increase r, combined with a decrease in ts such that seller participation (1 F (ts))=r
remains unchanged, cannot lead to an increase in prots. Given a change dr in reputation,
seller participation remains unchanged if the change in ts, dts, satises: dts =  (1=r)[(1 
F (ts))=f(t
s
)]dr. Hence, the platforms prot does not increase with an increase in r
combined with such a change in ts i¤ @(ts; t
b
; r)=@r   [@(ts; tb; r)=@ts](1=r)[(1  
F (ts))=f(t
s
)]  0. This condition implies that
yr  1  F (t
s
)
f(ts)
. (11)
Note that if r and ts satisfy the constraint of the problem, then the proposed change in
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r and ts does not violate that constraint. To see this, note that @f[1 F (ts)]=[1 F (ts 
d)]g=@ts  dts=dr = 1  ff(ts   d)=[1  F (ts   d)]g  ff(ts)=[1  F (ts)]g < 1.
Next, we show that for y su¢ ciently high, conditions (9)-(11) cannot hold simultaneously.
Let r = infx2R[1 F (x)]=[1 F (x d)]. We know it exists and that r > 0 since [1 F (x)]=[1 
F (x  d)] is always non-negative and by assumption bounded away from zero. Take a value of
y, say y, such that yr  [1   F (0)]=f(0) and yr  [1   G(0)]=g(0). For any value of y > y,
yr > yr. Thus, from (9) and (11) it follows that tb  yr < 0 and ts < 0, since both (1 G)=g
and (1   F )=f are decreasing by log-concavity of g and f . Moreover, from (9) and (10), we
obtain that yr  ts + tb. Clearly, conditions tb   yr < 0, ts < 0, and yr  ts + tb cannot
hold simultaneously.
Proof of Proposition 2. Analogous to that of Proposition 1 and therefore omitted.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider an arbitrary pair of transaction fees (tb; ts). Let T s be
such that sR(ts; T s; Db(tb; 1)) = sh(ts; Db(tb; 1)). Denote that value of T s by T s0 . Note that
T s0 exists, since (i) sR(t
s; T s; Xb) is continuous in T s, (ii) sR(ts; 0; Xb) = sl(ts) < sh(ts; Xb)
8Xb > 0, and (iii) limT s!+1 sR(ts; T s; Xb) = +1 8Xb > 0. Next, simply note that if fees are
tb; ts and T s0 , then r = 1, X
b = Db(tb; 1), N = F (sR(ts; T s; Db(tb; 1))), L = 0, H = 1 N , and
S = E=m satisfy all the conditions of Denition 2.
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose that the solution to the benchmark case is hts0; tb0; r = 1i.
Let s0 denote the corresponding threshold type of seller above which sellers trade. Because
r = 1, only sellers who take the high action trade, which implies that s0 = ts0. Thus seller
participation is given by Xs0 = 1   F (ts0) and in steady state there are E=m sellers. Buyer
participation is given by Xb0 = 1   G(tb0   y). The discounted value of the platforms prot
associated with the solution of the benchmark case is 0 = (1=(1  ))Xs0Xb0(tb0 + ts0)E=m.
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Under moral hazard, this allocation can be implemented as follows. Choose the buyers
transaction fee tb1 = t
b
0. Choose the sellerstransaction fee such that sellers of type above s0
prefer to choose the high action. Using the no-cheating condition (4), this transaction fee,
which we denote ts1, satises
d = 
(1 m)
1  (1 m)X
b
0[s0   ts1] (12)
and therefore sh(ts; Xb0) = s0. Now select the registration fee T
s
1 such that only sellers of type
above s0 trade. That is, choose
T s1 = V (s0) =
1
1  (1 m)X
b
0[s0   ts1] (13)
in which case only sellers of type above s0 register (and trade). Thus, seller participation
Xs1 = X
s
0 . All those who trade choose the high action, which implies a reputation of one and a
total number of sellers of E=m. Since tb1 = t
b
0 buyer participation also equals the benchmarks:
Xb1 = X
b
0. All that remains to show is that the platforms prot is the same as in the solution
of the benchmark. It consists of the revenues associated with the transaction fees and the
revenues associated with the registration fees. Specically,
1 =
1
1  X
s
1X
b
1(t
b
1 + t
s
1)E=m+ T
s
1X
s
1E=m+
1X
=1
mT s1X
s
1E=m
=
1
1  X
s
0X
b
0(t
b
0 + t
s
1)E=m+ T
s
1X
s
0

1 +
m
1  

E=m
=
1
1  X
s
0X
b
0(t
b
0 + t
s
1)E=m+ T
s
1X
s
0

1  (1 m)
1  

E=m
=
1
1  X
s
0X
b
0(t
b
0 + t
s
1)E=m+
1
1  (1 m)X
b
0[s0   ts1]Xs0

1  (1 m)
1  

E=m
=
1
1  X
s
0X
b
0(t
b
0 + t
s
0)E=m
= 0
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where the second equality follows from the fact that Xs1 = X
s
0 and X
b
1 = X
b
0; the fourth equality
follows by replacing T s1 with its value as given in (13) and noting that s0 = t
s
0.
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